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ABSTRACT 
In  this  paper  we  study  severa1  methods  of  ranking  profiles  of 
opportunity  sets  by  taking  as  a  primary  notion  equality  of  opportunity, 
undestood  as  equality  of  choice  sets.  Each  of  these  social  decision  rules 
looks  first  at  the  size  of  the  common  opportunity  set  available  to  al1 
members  of  tbe  society.  If  this  is  not  decisive,  additional  criteria  are 
used  in  a  lexicographic  procedure.  Axiomatic  characterizations  of  each 
methos  are also provided. 
KEYWORDS:  Equality of  Opportunity,  Ranking  Profiles of  Opportunity  Sets. 1.-  INTRODUCTION 
The  notion  of  equality  of  opportunity,  as  an  expression  of  social 
justice,  has  played  a  major  role  in  theoretical  and  applied  economics  and 
indeed  it is almost ubiquitous  in public economics. 
The  most  immediate  interpretation  of  equality  of  opportunity  is 
equality  of  individual  choice  sets  [see  Kolm  (1973)  (19951,  Thomson 
(1992)l.  According  to this,  equality  of  opportunity  has  mostly  to do  with 
equality  of  accessibility,  and  not  with  outcome  equality  [see  also  Arneson 
(1989),  Bossert  (1995),  Cohen  (1989),  Dworkin  (1981),  Herrero  (1995)  or 
Roemer  (1994)  for  different  models  in  which  personal  responsibiIity 
justifiably  restricts  the  degree  of  outcome  equalityl.  Yet,  there  is  a 
clear  conflict  between  the  ethical  value  of  previous  proposal  and  its 
practica1  relevance:  identical  choice  sets  is  a  rather  unlikely  event  even 
for twins,  and  a  theory  focusing  on  this  strict approach  will  leave  a  major 
class  of  situations  unsolved.  The  relevant  question  is,  therefore,  how  to 
rank  social  decisions  when  in  the  associated  profiles,  individual 
opportunity sets are not  identical. 
This  problem  has  been  treated  from  a  variety  of  viewpoints.  We  take 
the  less  demanding  approach  in  informational  terms:  the  planner  does  not 
take  into  account  any  information  on  individual  preferences.  To  the  best  of 
our  knowledge  the  first  attempt  to  rank  distributions  of  opportunity  sets 
in this setting is made  in Kranich  (1994). 
Apart  from  the  possible  planner's  lack  of  information  about  individual 
preferences,  two  other  difficulties  appear  related  to  the  use  of  private 
information  in  evaluating  opportunity  sets.  Tbe  first  one  refers  to  dynamic 
considerations  and  changing  tastes  leading  to  the  preferente  for 
flexibility  model  [see Kreps  (197911.  The  second  one  is related  to adapting 
preferences,  that  is,  to  the  idea  that  people  tend  to  adjust  their 
aspirations  to  their  possibilities,  as  argued  by  Elster  by  means  of  the 
sour grapes paradox [see Elster (1982),pp.2191. In  Kolm's  words  [Kolm (199511, 
"freedom  is  the  end-value  of  justice.  This  is  equivalent  to 
considering individuals'  preferences as irrelevant for justice" 
Kranich  (1994)  suggests  a  way  of  evaluating  profiles  of  (finite) 
opportunity  sets faced  by  a  group  of  agents.  He  proposses  to consider  only 
the difference  in  the  number  of  elements  faced  by  the  agents  as a  measure 
of  the  degree  of  inequality  of  opportunity.  That  is,  equality  in  the 
cardinality of  the choice  sets is al1 that matters. 
There  is  a  source  of  discomfort  in  Kranich's  proposal,  namely  that 
only  the  relative size of  the  opportunity  sets faced  by  the  agents  matters, 
while  neither  the  size  of  the  common  possibility  set, nor  the  absolute size 
of  the  opportunity  sets  are taken  into  account.  For  instance,  by  means  of 
such  a  procedure,  a  profile  A,  in  which  both  opportunity  sets have  a  single 
(and  different)  element  is  declared  as indifferent  to  a  profile  B,  in  which 
both opportunity  sets have many  (and identical) elements. 
The  main  proposal  of  this  paper  is  to  take  as  a  basic  approach  of 
equality  of  opportunity  the size  of  the cornrnon  opportunity set,  and  declare 
above  in the ranking  a  situation  having  a  bigger  common  set.  A  prohlem  with 
this  criterion  is  that  there  are  too  many  situations  which  are  not 
distinguishable  and  it  seems  sensible  to  take  into  account  also  additional 
characteristics  of  the  opportunity  profiles.  Thus,  as  a  second  step,  and  in 
the  case  we  face  a  couple  of  situations  such  that  the  size  of  the  common 
sets are identical, we  may  look at those additional properties. 
Since  additional  properties  play  a  subsidiary  role,  we  propose  some 
lexicographic  method  as a  proper  way  of  ranking  profiles  of  opportunity 
sets:  first  we  look  at  the  common  opportunity  set.  If  this  is  not  decisive, 
we  look  at  those  additional  properties.  With  this  in  mind,  three 
alternative  methods  are  studied  in  this  paper,  each  stressing  in  different 
ways  the  trade  off  between  pure  equality  of  opportunity  and  efficiency. 
For the sake of  simplicity we  only  deal witb the two-person  case. In  a  first place  we  study  the cornrnon  opportunity relation,  where  only 
equality  of  opportunity  issues  are  taking  into  account.  In  this  case,  the 
Kranich's  cardinality  difference  relation  is  taken  as  a  subsidiary 
criterion.  In  a  second  place,  we  propose  the  lexrnin  opportunity  relation, 
where  at a  second  step  we  look  at the  sizes  of  the  individual  opportunity 
sets,  starting  by  the  smallest  ones.  Finally,  we  also  study  the  utilitarian 
opportunity  relation.  Now,  the  complementary  criterion  is  the  size  of  the 
aggregate opportunity  set. 
Section  2  is  devoted  to  notation  and  preliminaries.  Sections  3  to  5 
have  a  common  structure.  We  present  a  particular  social  relation,  then  we 
provide  with  an  axiomatic  characterizatíon  of  the  relation,  and  we  prove 
the  independence  of  the  axioms  used.  Finally,  Section  6,  with  some  final 
cornments,  closes the paper. 2.-  PRELIMINARIES:  NOTATION  AND  DEFINITIONS 
Let  N  =  {1,2, ...,  n)  denote  the  set  of  agents,  and  L  be  an  infinite  set 
of  opportunities.  We  denote  the  set of  nonempty,  finite subsets  of  L  by  (e, 
and  consider  lists  or  profiles  of  opportunity  sets  of  the  form 
1  i  A  =  (A ,...,An), where  A  E  (e  for al1  i  E  N.  Let  (en  =.TI  (e  denote  the set of 
1 EN 
al1 prof iles. 
A  social  relation  is  a  complete,  reflexive  and  transitive  relation  t 
defined  on  (en  that  ranks  distributions  of  opportunities  on  the  basis  of 
some  fairnecs criteria.  For  A,  B  E  (e",  we  write A  2  B  meaning  that profile 
A  is  socially  considered  at  least  as  good  as profile  B.  As  usual,  >  and  - 
are the asymmetric and reflexive parts, respectively,  of  2. 
If  A,B  E  2,  A  c  B,  A  C  B  denotes  strict  and  weak 
inclusion;  A\B  =  {  x  E  Al  x  B  );  #  A  =  number  of  elements  in  set  A; 
For  A  E  E",  c(A) denotes  a  permutation  of  N  such  that  #  AC")  i #  A~(~)  a 
1  ...  5  #  A~'"); #  A  =  (#  A ,...,  #  A").  Vector  inequalities  are  denoted  >>,  > 
and  2 with  the  usual  interpretation  í  a >>  b <=>  a  >  b  for  al1  i;  a >  b 
i  i 
<=>  a  2  b.  for  al1  i  and  a  ;c  b;  a s b  <=>  a  z  b.  for  al1  il.  The 
i  i  I 
lexicographic  ordering  L  in  R"  is  defined  as  usually:  for  any  a,b c  IR", 
a >.  b <=>  a.  > b  and  a  = b  for al1 k <  i. 
L  i  1'  k  k 
Consider  now  the  two-agents  case.  Thus,  a  profile  is  a  pair 
12  Z  A  =  (A ,A ),  A'  E  (e.  Now,  for  a  social  relation  2  on  (e,  the  following 
properties will  be  used  in the sequel: 12  2  1  ANONYMITY  (AN):  For any A  E  g2, A  =  (A ,A  1,  A - (A ,A 1. 
12  UNIFORMATION  OF OPPORTUNITY  SETS  (UNJ):  For any A  E  f2,  A  =  (A ,A  1, 
X  S  A1\A2,  Y  S  A'\A',  x é  A1n.4',  then I(A~V()U~~>,(A~\Y)U{X>)~  > A. 
12  2  COMMON  REPLACING  (REP): For any A  6 !E2,  A  =  (A ,A  1,  if  x  E  A1nA  , y  E  L, 
y  é  (A1\{x})u(A2\{x>),  then  [(A~\~X>)U~~>,(A~\~X>)U~~>I  -  A. 
12  2  2  1  UNCOMMON  REPLACING  (UR):  For  any A  E  f2,  A  =  (A ,A  1,  if  x  E  A \A  , 
x  é  A2\{x2},  then [A~,(A~\~X~>)U~X>I  z  A. 
12  2  IRRELEVANT  EXPANSIONS  (IE): For any A  E  gZ, A  =  (A ,A 1,  if  x,  y  é  A1uA  , 
x * y,  then [A1u~x>,A2u~y>l  - A. 
NEGATIVE  MONOTONICITY  (NM):  For any A  E  f2,  A  =  (A1,A2)  if  A'  S  A2  c B2, 
12 
then A  > (A ,B  1. 
12 
MONOTONICITY  (MON):  For  any  A  E  x2,  A  =  (A ,A  if  A'  2  B1,  A2  c B2, 
A1uAZ  c B'UB'  , then B  > A. 
TRANSFER  (SR):  For  any  A  E  f2, A  =  (A1,A2),  X  C  A2\A1,  x  é  A'.  If 
#  (A1u{x>)  5  #  (AZ\x),  then (A'U{X>,A~\X) > A. 
IRRELEVANT  TRANSFERS  (IT):  Let  A  =  (A1,A2)  E  fZ, and x  E  A1\A2.  Then, 
(A'\{~),A~u{x>) - A. 
Previous  properties  have  different  status.  A  first group  of  properties have  to  do  either  with  the  setting  or  with  our  basic  principle  in  ranking 
profiles  of  opportunity  sets,  and  are  fulfilled  by  al1  the  proposed 
relations.  A  second  group  of  properties  are  reiated  with  possible 
alternative  complementary  principies,  and  they  play  the  role  of 
differentiating among the relations we  propose. 
Within  the  first  group  of  properties,  AN  is  a  minirnal  fairness 
principle.  It  says  that  agents'  identities  play  no  role  on  the  social 
ordering.  UN1  is  the  expression  of  the  priority  of  the  common  opportunity 
set.  It  says  that  whenever  opportunity  sets  becorne  more  similar,  then  the 
new  situation  is  ranked  above  the  previous  one.  As  for  REP  and  UR,  they 
reflect  the  planner's  lack  of  inforrnation  on  individual  preferences  and/or 
perceptions  of  the  alternatives.  So,  REP  has  to do  with  the way  the planner 
looks at the cornmon  set. Whenever  sornething common  is replaced by  something 
else,  both  situations  are  ranked  equally.  On  the  other  hand,  UR  says  that 
if  we  change  a  non  comrnon  element  by  a  different one,  the new  situation  is 
not  ranked  beiow,  reflecting  not  only  the  lack  of  information  but  also  the 
possibility  of  strict  irnprovements  due  to  a  possible  enlargement  of  the 
common opportunity  set. 
In  the  second  group  of  axioms,  IE  and  NM  follow  the  line  of  taking 
only  care  of  the  pure  concept  of  equality  of  opportunity.  Adding  different 
opportunities  to  both  agents  does  not  affect  the  ranking  (IE),  and  if  we 
enlarge  the  opportunities  of  the  agent  facing  the  biggest  set,  then  the 
degree  of  equality  of  opportunity  decreases  (NM).  TR  deals  with  the 
transfer  principle  as  a  way  of  decreasing  inequalities:  whenever  we 
transfer  opportunities  from  those  agents  facing  more  opportunities  to those facing  less,  the  degree  of  inequality  decreases.  Both  MON  and  IT  deal  with 
different  aspects  of  efficiency.  MON  means  that  whenever  the  opportunity 
set of  an agent  expands,  the  situation  becomes  better.  IT  says that  we  rank 
equally  any  situation  having  identical  common  opportunities  irrespective  of 
who  is the  agent  enjoying  non  common  opportunities.  Notice  that  IT  implies 
AN. 
Consider  now  the following social  relations: 
DEFINITION  O  [Kranich  (1994)l:  For  A,  B  6 x',  the  cardinality  difference 
relation, i  is defined  by: 
cd 
DEFINITION  1:  For  A,  B  E  (eZ,  the  cornmon  opportunity  relation,  z  is 
co 
defined  by:  A  2  B  <=> 
CO 
DEFINITION  2:  For  A,  B  6 (e2,  the  utilitarian  opportunity  relation,  2  is 
U 
defined  by: 
DEFINITION  3:  For  A,  B  6  (ez,  the  lexmin  opportunity  relation,  2  is 
lo 
defined  by: Previous  social  relations  rank  profiles  of  opportunity  sets  in 
different  ways.  For  the  cardinality  difference  relation  al1  that  matters  is 
whether  opportunity  sets  have  equal  size.  In  the  remaining  relations  we 
consider  that  the  most  important  criterion  deals  with  the  cornmon 
opportunity  set.  With  such  a  spirit,  we  start  by  considering  the  common 
opportunity  relation,  which  ranks  profiles  on  the  basis  of  the  size  of  the 
common  opportunity  set,  and,  at  a  second  step,  by  looking  at  the 
differences  in  the  size.  The  utilitarian  opportunity  relation  looks  at  a 
second  step  at  the  size  of  the  aggregate  opportunities  set.  Finally,  the 
lexmin  opportunity  relation  uses  as  a  complementary  criterion  the  sizes  of 
both indiviual  opportunity sets, starting by  the smallest one. 3.  AXIOMATIC  CHARACTERIZATION  OF THE  COMMON  OPPORTUNITY  RELATION 
THEOREM  1.-  A  weak  preorder  2 on  de2  satisfies AN,  UNI,  REP,  UR,  IE  and NM 
if  and  only  if  2 coincides  with  2  . 
CO 
PROOF: 
Obviously,  2  satisfies  al1  the  properties.  Let  us  see  the  sufficiency 
CO 
part. By  AN,  we  may  assume,  for any A  E deZ  that A  = <r(A). 
(i) Let  A,  B E  2'  such that [# (A1nA2),# Al  = [# (B1nB2),# B1.  Then  A  - B. 
Choose  x  E  A1nA2,  y  E  B1nB2.  Thus,  by  REP,  [(~~\~x))u~y~,(~~\~x~)u~~~l  -  A. 
By  repeating  the  procedure  a  suitable  number  of  times,  and  by  transitivity, 
we  obtain that C  = (c1,c2)  - A,  where ci =  [A'\(A~~A~)IV(B~~B~). 
12  Now,  take  x E  A1\A2,  y  E  B1\B2.  Thus,  by  construction,  x  E  C\C , and  by 
1  UR,  [(C \~X})U{~~,C~I  2  C.  By  suitahly  repetition  of  the  procedure  and 
12  transitivity, we  get that (B ,C )  2 C. 
2  1  Apply  a  symrnetric  procedure  to the  previous  one  for x  E  A  \A,  y  E  B2\B1. 
1  12  12  Thus,  [B ,(C~\{X))U{~)I  2  (B ,C  ).  By  repeating  the  procedure,  B  r  (B ,C ). 
Then,  by  transitivity, B r A. 
By  a  similar  procedure,  starting  by  B,  we  also  obtain  A  2  B,  and 
therefore,  A - B. 
12  (ii) Let  A  =  (A ,A  ),  B  =  (B',B')  E  deZ  such  that  #  (A'AA')  =  #  (B1nB2), 
2  2  #  A'  - #  A  = #  B'  - #  B . TO  proof:  A - B. 
Assume,  without  loss  of  generality,  that  #  A'  >  #  B'.  Then,  by  repeated 
application of  IE,  A - B. 
2  12  As  a  consequence,  for  any  A  E  de  , we  may  find  B -  A,  B  =  (B ,B  ),  with 
1  2  B  GB. 12  2  12  12  (iii)  Let  A  =  (A ,A ),  B  =  (B1,B2)  E  2  such  that  #  (AnA )  =  #  (BnB ), 
1  1  #  A'  - #  A2  >  #  B'  - #  B2.  TO proof:  A  > B.  Choose A,  B  such that A  = B , 
1  2  2  A  S  A  c  B . Then,  by NM,  A  > B. 
12  12  12  (iv)  Let  A  =  (A ,A  ),  B  =  (B',B')  E  2'  such  that  #  (AnA )  >  #  (BnB 1. 
To proof:  A  > B. 
1  2  1  12  (iv.a)  If  moreover,  #  A  -  #  A  b  #  B  -  #  B2,  constr~ct  C  =  (B uX,B vX), 
1  12 
where  X  is  chosen  such  that  #  X  =  #  (B'~B~)  -  #  (A n~'), X  n  (B UB )  =  0. 
Thus, #  (cinc2)  = #  (A'~A'),  #  C'  - #  c2 = #  B1  - #  B2.  By  UNI,  C  t-  B,  and 
by (iii), A  > C. Thus, by transitivity,  A  > B. 
2 
(iv.b)  Take now the  case #  A'  - #  A2  <  #  B1  - #  B . BY  (i), we  may assume 
2  1 
that B1  S  B2  c  A'  c  A'.  NOW, take X = A \B  , and Y  such that #  Y = #  X,  and 
ynA2 = 0.  By  applying  IE a  suitable number  of  times  (# X),  we obtain that 
(B'UY,B~UX) =  (B'UY,A~) - B. 
Now  take Z  =  A1\B1.  Then,  by  UNI,  A  =  [~(B'UY)\Y}UZ,  A']  t-  (B1u~,A2),  and 
by transitivity,  A  t- B. 
THEOREM  2.-  AN,  UNI,  REP,  UR,  IE and NM  are independent. 
PROOF: 
We  provide  with  examples  of  weak  preorders  satisfying  al1  the  properties 
but one at any time: 
12 
(AN)  Take z1  defined  by  (A  ,A )  Zl  (B1,B2)  <=>  [#  (A'~A'),#  A'  - #  A']  ZL 
[#  (B'~B'),  #  B'  -  #  B21.  It satisfies REP,  UNI,  UR,  IE  and NM,  but  it does 
not satisfy AN:  ((x,y,zj,(x,yj)  >l({x,y},{x,y,z>). 
(UNI)  Consider  Z  =  2  It satisfies AN,  REP,  UR,  IE  and NM,  but  it does 
2  cd' 
not satisfy UNI:  (ta},{b})  - ({a},{aj). (REP) Consider  a  fixed set K c  L,  Now,  A  >  B  <=>  A  >  B,  and  if  A  -  B, 
3  CO  CO 
when  #  (A'nAZn~)  >  #  (B1nB2n~).  It satisfies  AN,  UNI,  UR,  IE  and  NM,  but 
1  does  not  satisfy  REP:  Let  A  be  such  that  x  E  A M',  x e  K,  y  E  K.  Thus, 
[(A'\(X>)U~~>,(A~\(X>)U{Y>)  >3 A. 
(UR) Take  a  fixed set K c  L.  Now,  A  >  B  <=>  A  >  B,  and  if  A  -  B,  when 
4  CO  CO 
#  [(A1uA2)n~1  >  #  [(B'UB~)~KI.  It  satisfies  AN,  UNI,  REP,  IE  and  NM,  but 
does  not  satisfy  UR:  Let  A  be  such  that  x  E  A2\A1,  x  E  K,  y  e  K, 
y  st  AZ\(x>. Thus,  A  >4  [A~,(A~\(X>)U(~>I. 
(IE) Take  2  defined as follows:  (A1,AZ)  2  (B1,B2)  <=> 
5  5 
#  Bw(l) 
#  (A1nAZ),  1 
.  It  satisfies  AN,  UNI, 
#  B"(Z' 
REP,  UR,  and  NM,  but  it  does  not  satisfy  IE: 
((x,z>,(x,y,t>)  ((x),(x,Y>). 
12  12  (NM) Consider  2  defined  as follows:  (A ,A  )  i6 (B ,B  )  <=> 
6 
[  #  (A1nAZ), #  AO(')  -  #  AO(l) 
12  1  iL [  #  (BnB), #  A e(')  -  #  AO(l)  l.  It 
satisfies AN,  UNI,  REP,  UR,  IE  but  does  not  fulfill  NM: 
((x>,tx,y>l  t6  ((x>,(x>). 4.  THE  UTILITARIAN  OPPORTUNITY  RELATION 
THEOREM  3.- A  weak  preorder r on  bez  satisfies UNI,  REP,  UR, MON  and  IT 
if  and only  if  z  coincides  with  2 . 
U 
PROOF: 
Since  2  obviously  satisfies  al1  the  properties,  we  only  deal  with  the 
U 
sufficiency part. 
12  (i)  Let  A,  B  E  be2,  A  =  (A1,A2),  B  =  (B1,BZ)  such  that  #  (AnA )  = 
1  2  #  (B'~B'),  #  (A'vA')  =  #  (B'UB~).  By  IT,  we  may  assume  that  A  A , 
1  2  1'  B  S  B .  Assume  furthermore  that  An BJ  =  0  for  al1  i,j =  1,2.  Now,  by 
repeated  application  of  REP,  IA~\(A~~A~)~(B~~B~),A~\(A~~A~)~(B~~B~)I  -  A. 
Then,  by  UR,  B  2 A.  By  a  similar  argument,  A  Z  B,  and  in  consequence, 
A  - B. 
(ii)  Let  A,  B  E  be2,  A  =  (A1,AZ),  B  =  (B1,B2)  be  such  that  #  (Aln~') = 
1  2 
#  (B1nB2),  #  (A'uA2)  >  #  (B1uB2).  By  IT,  we  may  consider  that  A  S  A , 
B'  S  B',  #  A1  = #  B1,  #  A'  >  #  B2.  Consider  C2  3  B2  such that #  c2 = #  A'. 
Then,  by  MON,  (B1,C2) >  B, and  by  (i),  (B1,C2) -  A.  Thus,  by  transitivity, 
A  > B. 
(iii)  Let  A,  B  E  be2,  A  =  (A',A'),  B  =  (B1,BZ)  be  such  that 
1  2  1  2  #  (A'~A~)  >  #  (B'nB2).  Again,  by  IT,  assume  that  A  G  A , B  S  B .  If 
2  2  1  2  1  1  2  moreover,  #  A  2  #  B , take C  3  B',  C  2 B2  such  that  #  C  =  #  A, #  C = 
#  A'.  Then,  by  MON,  C  > B,  and  by  (i), A - C.  Thus,  by  transitivity, A > B. 
2  2  1  Consider  now  the cace  #  A  <  #  B . Let  p  =  #  A  - #  B'.  Take  C2  3  BZ such 
12  that  #  C2  >  #  A'  +  p.  Thus,  by  MON,  (B ,C  )  >  B.  Take  now  x E  cZ\Bi, 1 
0 c 9, and  y  E  L,  y  é  9'.  Thus,  by  UNI,  l~'u(y~,(~~\(x~)u~y~l  >  (9',c2). 
Applying  UN1  p  times,  and  choosing  appropriately  X  c  C\B'  in  the  last 
12  1  2  2  1  step,  we  end  up  at some  D  =  (D ,D  )  >  (9 ,C  ),  such  that  D'  C  D , #  A  = 
#  D',  #  A2 = #  D'.  Thus,  by  (i), A  - D,  and  by  transitivity,  A  > B.. 
THEOREM  4.-  UNI,  REP,  UR,  MON  and IT  are independent. 
PROOF: 
Again,  we  provide  with  examples  of  weak  preorders  such  that  satisfy  al1 but 
one  of  previous  properties at any  time. 
(UN11  Consider  r1  defined  by  A  r  B  iff  #  (A'uA2)  z  #  (B'uB~).  It 
1 
satisfies  REP,  UR,  MON  and  IT,  but  it  fails  to  satisfy  UNI: 
((a,e,c),(a,f,d}) >;  ((a,b,c),(a,b,d)l. 
(REP)  Consider  i2  defined  as  follows:  Take  a  fixed  set  K  c  L.  Now, 
A  >  B  <=>  A  >  B,  and  if  A  -  B,  when  #  (A1nA2nK) >  #  (9ln~~n~).  It 
2  U 
satisfies UNI,  UR,  MON  and  IT,  but  does  not  satisfy REP:  Let  A  be  such that 
x  E  A'~A~,  x é  K,  Y  E  K.  T~US,  I(A~\(X})U{~},(A~\(~})U{~})  >2 A. 
(UR)  Consider  defined  as  follows:  Take  a  fixed  set  K  c  L,  Now, 
3 
A  >  B  <=>  A  >  B,  and  if  A  -  B,  when  #  l(~~uA~)nKl  >  #  [(B'UB~)~KI.  It 
3  U  U 
satisfies UNI,  REP,  MON  and  IT,  but  does  not  satisfy UR:  Let  A  be  such that 
2  1  x  E  A  \A,  x E  K,  y é.  K,  y e AZ\(x).  Thus,  A  >3  [(A1,(A2\(~})u(y})l. 
(MON)  Consider  Z  defined  by  A  2  B iff  #  (A1nA2) i #  (9'nBZ). It satisfies 
4  4 
UNI,  REP,  UR  and  IT,  but  it  fails  to  fulfill  MON: 
({a,b},(a,b,c>)  -4  ((a,b),(a,b}). 
(IT) Consider  2  defined  by  2  =  2  .  It  satisfies  UNI,  REP,  UR  and  MON, 
5  5  lo 
but  it fails to fulfill IT:  (ta,b),(a,c,d)) >  ((a},(a,b,c,d)).. 5.  THE LEXIMIN  OPPORTUNITY RELATION 
THEOREM  5.- A  weak preorder z  on 2'  satisfies AN,  UNI,  REP,  UR,MON,  and 
TR if  and only if  2 coincides with z  . 
lo 
PROOF: 
By  AN,  Consider  A  =  <r(A),  B  =  o-(B).  Without  loss  of  generality,  we may 
12  12  consider A  =  (A ,A ),  B  =  (B ,B )  such that  AinBj = !a  , for al1 i,j = 1,2. 
(i)  Let  A,  B  E  2'  such  that  [#  (A'AA~),  #  Al  =  [#  (B1nB2),  #  B1. 
Then  A  -  B.  Notice  that  this  is  exactly  case (i)  in  Theorem  1.  The  same 
proof  applies. 
(ii)  Let  A,  B  E  2'  be  such  that  #  (A'nA2)  =  #(B'nBZ);  #  A'  =  #  B', 
#  A2  <  #  B2.  Then B  > A. 
Choose  c2 3  A'  such  that  #  c2 =  #  BZ  and  A1nA2  =  A1nc2.  By  MON, 
12 
(A ,C )  > A,  and by (i), (A',c2)  - B.  Thus, by transitivity, B  > A. 
(iii)  Let A,  B  E f2  be such that #  (A'~A')  =  #  (B'nB2);  #  A'  <  #  B'.  Then 
B  > A. 
2  2  2  If  moreover  #  A  5  #  B2,  Take  C'  3  A',  C  2  A  such  that  A1nA2  = 
c'nc2,  #  C'  =  #  B',  #  c2 =  #  BZ.  Then,  by  MON,  C  > A,  and by (i), C - B. 
Thus, by transitivity,  B  > A. 
Consider  now  the  case  #  A'  >  #  B'.  Take  X  S  A\A1  such  that 
12  #  B2  2  #  (A2\x)  2  #  A'  +  1,  and  choose  x  B  A UA .  Then,  by  TR, 
(A'u{x>,AZ\~)  >  A.  But  #  (A1u¿x})  5  #  B1,  #  (AZ\x)  #  BZ,  and 
#  (A'U(X})~(A'\X)  =  #  (B1nB2).  In  consequence,  B  2  (A'u¿x>,A2\~),  and  by 
transitivity,  B  > A. (iv) Let A,  B E  g2 be  such that #  (A1nA2) <  #  (B'~B~).  Then  B  > A. 
12  12  12  Consider  first the  case  A nA  =  0.  Then,  #  (B nB  )  2  1.  Take  x  E  B nB  .  By 
1  2  UNI,  ((x),{x))  2-  A.  If  B  =  B  =  {x),  we  are  done.  Otherwise,  by  MON, 
B  > ({x},{xj),  and by  transitivity, B  > A. 
1  Suppose now  that AnA2 ?t  D,  and  #  (B'~B~)  = #  (A'nA2)  +  1.  Take  X  c A  such 
that  #  (A'VO  <  #  B',  and  x  @  A'nA2.  Then,  by  UNI,  [(A~\X)U~X>,A~U~X)I  > 
A.  Furthermore,  #  [(A1\X)utx)ln(A2u(x>) =  #  (B1nB2),  #  [(A1\~)utx~l  <  #  B1. 
Thus,  by  (iii), B  > [(A1\~)utx),A2u(x>l,  and by  transitivity, B  > A. 
Finally,  assume  that  A1nA2  s a,  and  #  (B1nB2)  =  #  (A1nA2)  +  p,  p  2  2. 
Construct  C'  = A'UY, c2=  A'UY,  such that #  (cinc2)  =  #  (B'~B')  - 1.  By  MON, 
C > A.  Now,  we  are in the previous  case and  may  act as before.. 
THEOREM  6.-  AN,  UNI,  REP,  UR,  MON,  and  TR  are independent. 
PROOF: 
We  provide  with  examples  of  equality  relations  fulfilling  al1  but  one 
property at any time: 
(AN)  Define  2  in  the  following  way:  A  2  B  <=>  (#  (A1nA2),  #  A)  iL 
1  1 
(#  (B'~B'),  #  B).  It  satisfies UNI,  REP,  UR,  MON  and  TR  but  it fails to 
satisfy AN:  (ta,b>,tc>)  >l  (tc>,ta,b)). 
12  (UNI)  Define  r  in  the  following  way:  A  2  B  <=>  [#  Aff"',  #  (A VA  )] tL 
2  2 
I#  BW(",# [B~UB~)I.  It  satisfies  AN,  REP,  UR,  MON  and  TR  but  it does  not 
satisfy UNI:  ((a>,(b,c)) >;  (td),(d)). 
(REP)  Consider  z3 defined  as  follows:  Take  a  fixed  set  K  c  L,  Now, 
A  >  B  <=>  A  >  B,  and  if  A  -  B,  when  #  (A'nA2n~) >  #  (B1nBZn~).  It 
3  lo  lo satisfies AN,  UNI,  UR,  MON  and  TR,  but  it  does  not  satisfy  REP:  Let  A  be 
such that x E  A1nAZ, x 6f  K,  y  E  K.  Thus,  [(A'\~X~)U~~~,(A~\~X~)U~~~)  >3  A. 
(UR)  Consider  r  defined  as  follows:  Take  a  fixed  set  K  c  L.  Now, 
4 
A  t4  B <=>  A  >,o  B,  and  if  A  -  B,  when  #  (A'uA')~K  >  #  (B'uB')~K.  It 
lo 
satisfies AN,  UNI,  REP,  MON  and  TR,  but  it  does  not  satisfy UR:  Let  A  be 
such  that  x  E  A'\A',  x  E  K,  y  6f  K,  y  @  A\{X).  Thus, 
A  t4  [(~~,(A~\tx))uty>)l. 
(MON) Take r5  defined as follows:  (A1,A2) z5 (B',B2)  <=> 
[  #  (A1nAZ), #  ~~"'1  r  [  #  (B1nBZ), #  ~~"'1  .  It  fulfills  AN,  UNI,  REP, 
L 
UR  and  TR,  but it does not satisfy MON:  ((a),(a,b>) -5  (ta),ta)). 
(TR)  Take  2  to  be  the  utilitarian  opportunity  relation.  It  satisfies  AN, 
6 
UNI,  REP,  UR  and MON,  but  it  does  not  satisfy  TR: 
(ta},ta,b,c,d>) p6 ((a,b),(a,b}).m 6. FINAL  REMARKS 
We  start by  providing  a  summary  of  results  in  Table  1.  The  different 
columns  refer  to  the  different  social  relations  studied  in  this  paper.  The 
last  column  corresponds  to  the  cardinality  difference  relation  presented  in 
Kranich  (1994).  We  summarize  the  behavior  of  the  aforementioned  relations 
with  respect  to  the  properties  presented  in  Section  2.  The  starred 
properties  correspond  to  the  properties  used  in  the  characterization 
results offered in the paper. 
A N  yes*  yes  yes*  Y~S 
UN  I  yes*  yes*  yes*  no 
REP  yes*  yes*  yes*  Y~S 
U R  yes*  yes*  yes*  Y~S 
- 
1 E  yes*  no  no  Y~S 
NM  yes*  no  no  yes 
MON  RO  yes*  yes*  no 
-- - -  - 
T R  ye  S  no  yes*  Y- 
I T  no  yes*  no  no 
Table 1 
Some remarks are in  order: 
(1)  Among  al1  the  properties  presented,  AN  and  NM  appear  in  Kranich 
(1994).  Moreover,  IE  shares  the  same  spirit  than  Kranich's 
Independence  of  Common  Expansions. (2) The  cardinality  difference  relation  satisfies  TR,  but  it  does  not 
satisfy UNI.  Nonetheless,  UN1  is satisfied by  al1 our relations. 
(3) As  for the remaining  properties,  REP  and  UR  are also  satisfied  by 
al1  the  relations;  MON  is  satisfied  by  al1  of  them  but  2  and  TR  is 
CO 
satisfied by  al1 of  them  but  2 . 
U 
(4)  Relations  2  and  2  extend  straightforwardly  to  the  n-person 
U  lo 
case,  whereas 2  presents analogous difficulties to Zcd. 
CO 
(5)  Throughout  the  paper  we  assumed  that  al1  information  on  individual 
preferences  is  irrelevant  for  the  social  ranking.  A  hidden  assurnption 
sornehow  included  in  the  previous  one  is  that  the  possible  diversity  or 
similarity  between  the  basic  opportunities  is  also  neglected.  This  can  be  a 
matter  of  discussion.  When  we  compare  two  individual  choice  sets, we  do  not 
pay  attention  to  the  similarity  between  the  alternatives  they  contain.  In 
the  case  we  would  like  to  take  these  similarities  into  account,  we  should 
deal,  at  the  same  time,  with  a  binary  relation  describing  such 
similarities.  When  this  similarity  is  conceived  as  an  equivalence  relation, 
a  simple  strategy  for  extending  our  results  may  be  to  reconstruct  our 
social  relations  over  the  quotient  set.  In  the  case  the  similarity  relation 
is  less  structured  the  situation  becomes  more  complex  and  deserves 
additional research. REFERENCES 
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